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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Frank J. Tankovich, appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence 
against him for Malicious Harassment, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204, and 
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, a felony, I. C. §§ 18-7902, 18-7901 
pursuant to the District Court's Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence 
thereon. (R. 715-719). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Tankovich's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
II. 
ISSUES 
A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Sever trials? 
B. Did the District Court err by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos 
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 
C. Did the District Court err by allowing expert testimony regarding the same 
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 





A The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motions to 5~ler Trials. 
As stated in Mr. Tankovich's Appellant's Brief, an abuse of discretion standard is 
applied when reviewing the denial of a motion to sever pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
14; however, that rule presumes joinder was proper in the first place. State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007).Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides the mechanism for 
relief from prejudicial joinder of trials. That rule states that if it appears that a defendant 
is prejudiced by the joinder of offenses or defendants for trial together, the court may, 
among other remedies, grant separate trials. 
When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is 
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted 
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial. state v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 
908, 55 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002). In cases such as this, Idaho appellate courts 
review the trial proceeding to determine whether one or more of the following "potential 
sources of prejudice" appeared: (a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and 
cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the 
potential that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the 
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find 
him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her criminal disposition, i.e. he or 
she is a bad person. /d. 
As stated in his Appellant's Brief, and as is apparent even from the Respondent's 
Brief, the joinder of Mr. Tankovich's trial with the trials of his codefendants, Ira and 
William Tankovich, was unfairly prejudicial to his case, due to the evidence of tattoos 
borne by the codefendants, and the expert witness testimony offered by the State 
regarding those tattoos because of the risk that the jury would confuse andlor cumulate 
the evidence, despite instruction, andlor the risk that Mr. Tankovich would be 
confounded in presenting his defense. 
The tattoo evidence and expert testimony opining thereon was offered by the 
state to show motive or intent. As noted previously, Frank Tankovich does rIot have any 
such tattoos. Yet, much of the evidence presented in the trial was based on the tattoos 
borne by the codefendants. Therefore, it is Mr. Tankovich's position that neither the 
evidence of the tattoos, nor the expert testimony regarding the tattoos, should have 
been admitted in his case. 
The difficulty in keeping the tattoo evidence distinct and separate in this case is 
evident from the discussion of the issue in the hearing held on August 10, 2010, 
regarding the State's motion in limine to allow the expert witness testimony regarding 
the tattoos. (Tr. 8/10/10). In that hearing, the District Court acknowledged that Frank 
Tankovich did not have any such tattoos and that expert testimony would not be allowed 
as against him. (Tr. 8/10/10, Pg. 19, Lines 1-9). However, only minutBs later in the 
same hearing, the District Court stated: "But I don't think the expert can tell us what Mr. 
Frank Tankovich or Mr. William Tankovich were thinking when they got their tattoos or 
when they wore these tattoos when this incident occurred." (Tr. 8/10/10, Pg. 22 Lines 
19-19). This quote shows the danger of confusing the evidence or cumulating the 
evidence as against Frank Tankovich when there was no showing he wore or displayed 
any tattoos. Mr. Tankovich submits that if the District Court was at risk of confusing the 
issue, so was the jury at risk of confusion or cumulation. 
Moreover, despite that fact that the District Court had just noted ri8r.i( Tankovich 
had no such tattoos, essentially giving itself an UinstiUction" by way of its finding, the 
District Court went on to confuse the evidence. This demonstrates that the limiting 
instruction was insufficient to cure the unfair prejudice caused by trying the three 
defendants together when one of the primary methods for establishing motive as 
against at least two of the defendants was the existence of their tattoos. The risk for 
adjudicating "guilt by association", rather than based on the facts, was too great, and 
was not cured by the instructions. 
Further as noted in the Appellant's brief, the District Court itself recognized the 
problems in the case, noting that he had some serious reservations regarding whether 
the case was about race, or really about traditional malicious harassrnent. (Tr. Pg. 
2330, Line 17 - Pg. 2332, Line 2). The District Court there noted that in its view it would 
be just as reasonable to conclude that the statements uttered were uttered in anger 
over a gun having been pointed at the defendants as about race. The District Court 
further noted that if the case had been tried to him, the result would have been different. 
(Tr. Pg. 2334, Lines 16 - 14). 
As argued previously, given that the state's case was so weak that it drew 
comment from the district judge, the prejudice suffered by Frank Tankovich having 
evidence of tattoos belonging to other individuals, including expert testimony 
emphasizing those tattoos, is quite evident. Leaving Frank Tankovich's case joined 
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joined with the other codefendants leads to the danger that the jury would cumulate or 
confuse the evidence, including that of the tattoos, against Frank Tankovich, and that 
Frank Tankovich would be confounded in presenting his defenses, given that his case 
was filled with testimony and evidence regarding allegedly racist tattoos that he did not 
own or bear. 
Further given that the District Court noted that the case was problematic and that 
had the case been tried to him he would not have convicted, that one jury hung 11 to 1 
regarding Count 1 favoring acquittal, and 8 to 4 regarding Count 2 favoring acquittal, 
(Tr. Pg. 1470, Line 22 - Pg. 1471, Line 19), the record is strong that F!ank Tankovich 
was unfairly prejudiced by failing to sever his case in a manner that prevented him from 
having a fair trial. Thus, the District Court erred by denying severence. 
B. The District Court erred by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos 
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants. 
In its response, the State argues that Mr. Tankovich cannot complain of evidence 
that was not admitted as against him. (Respondent's Brief, pgs. 12-15). However, the 
record demonstrates that the tattoo evidence was admitted in Mr. Frank Tankovich's 
trial as against him, and even if it was not admitted as against him directly, the presence 
of that evidence in his trial, despite any instructions, was unfairly prejudicial as against 
him. 
In fact, the District Court noted, in its oral ruling allowing the tattorl~vidence prior 
to the March 29, 2010 trial, that despite the fact that Frank Tankovich did not have such 
a tattoo, the State should be free to offer the evidence, and that the fact he did not have 
sucl-J a tattoo goes to the weight of the evidence but did not lead to the evidence being 
barred. (Tr. 3/25/10, Pg. 180, Line 24-Pg, 181, Line 10). 
As noted in his Appellant's brief, Mr. Frank Tankovich moved to exclude 
evidence of the tattoos borne by Ira Tankovich and William Tankovich. (R. 386 - 388). 
Ira Tankovich hadd at tattoo that included the words "Aryan Pride", and an eagle on his 
back. (R. 100, 386). William Tankovich had a tattoo that included lightning bolt "ss" 
markings that were alleged to be Nazi type symbols. (R. 100, 386). The State sought 
to introduce the evidence of the above symbols, borne by codefendants, as evidence of 
state of mind, motive and intent concerning Mr. Frank Tankovich, and or concerning a 
conspiracy between the three codefendants (R. 73-74). Mr. Frank Tankovich does not 
have any such tattoos. 
Frank Tankovich reaffirms his contention that the fact that two other individuals 
whom he was with have tattoos of whatever kind is in no way probative regarding his 
state of mind, whether it be for proving his state of mind, or the existence of a 
conspiracy. Frank Tankovich cannot be held responsible for the tattoos borne by other 
individuals. 
Therefore, because the existence of tattoos on the bodies of codefendants does 
not have any tendency to make anything concerning the mind of Frank Tankovich state 
more or less probable, said evidence was not relevant in Frank Tankovich's case. 
I.R.E. 401. 
Moreover, even if the District Court did not abuse its discretion under I.R.E 401 in 
allowing the evidence of the tattoos. such evidence is legally irrelevant as against Frank 
Tankovich because its probative value regarding his state of mind andlor the existence 
of a conspiracy was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. To the extent the fact that other individuals 
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have tattoos that have Nazi or white supremacist associations bears any remote 
relationship to the state of mind of Frank Tankovich, or the existence of a conspiracy 
between the three defendants, such evidence is unfairly prejudicial against a man who 
does not have such tattoos on his body. Frank Tankovich did not put such symbols on 
his body. That others did does not say anything useful that is not dangerously 
outweighed by the prejudice or confusion risked by allowing such evidence. 
C. The District Court erred by allowing expert testimony regarding the same 
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendant§. 
First, the record contradicts the State's contention in its Respondsrlt's Brief that 
objection under LR.E. 701 and 702 was not preserved. The issue of this evidence was 
discussed fully under those rules in the August 10, 2010 hearing on the subject. (Tr. 
8/10/10 Pg. 9, Line 11 - Pg. 15, Line 1). LR.E. 701,702,401, 402, 4~, and 404(b) 
were all argued. Additionally, the District Court ruled on the evidence considering all of 
those rules. (Tr. 8/10/10 Pg. 17, Line 3 - Pg. 24, Line 11). The issue was preserved for 
appeal. 
Therefore, Frank Tankovich reaffirms his contention that admission of the 
purported expert testimony in the trial involving him, despite the presence of a limiting 
instruction, added to the prejudice of allowing evidence regarding tattoos borne by 
others into the case against him, and further invaded the province of the jUiY with regard 
to what those tattoos meant or how they were significant, especially as concerning him, 
who had no tattoos. 
In addition to the argument set forth previously in Mr. Tankovich's Appellant's 
Brief, Mr. Tankovich argues again that the said testimony does not illuminate or assist 
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the jury with regard to Frank Tankovich's beliefs, mindset, associations or any other 
material fact in question. Instead, said testimony only added to the prejudice of allowing 
the evidence of the tattoos borne by other individuals into Frank Tankovich's case in the 
first place. Although the District Court instructed the jury not to considdr the expert 
testimony as against Frank Tankovich, (Tr. Pg. 2124, Lines 12 - 23), the prejudice was 
nonetheless compounded. Instead of aiding the jury, the testimony added to the unfair 
prejudice and confusion created by allowing the evidence of the tattoos borne by the 
other charged individuals in the case against Frank Tankovich. I.R.E. 403. 
D. The District Court erred by failing to dismiss the case against Frank 
Tankovich pursuant to motion for acquittal due to insufficient evidence. 
The case against Frank Tankovich did not contain sufficient evidence upon which 
the jury could convict. Where the evidence at trial is insufficient to support a jury's 
finding of guilt, the court must overturn the verdict. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 
383,385,957 P2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998). 
The facts in evidence as against Frank Tankovich demonsiI'U!O an angry 
confrontation during which the alleged victim pulled a gun and pointed it at the 
defendants. Though Frank Tankovich may have yelled some angry statements, the 
evidence of racial intent is extremely deficient, especially when considered without the 
tattoo evidence, which should not have been allowed. 
The evidence otherwise in the case was not sufficient for the jury to convict. 
Therefore, Frank Tankovich respectfully requests that the Court overturn the jury's 
verdict against him. 
R 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tankovich respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial 
of his motion to sever, and reverse his objections to evidence about other individuals' 
tattoos, including the expert testimony allowed, that his conviction also be reversed, and 
the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2013. 
ST HEN D. THOMPSON 
Conflict Appellate Public Defender 
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